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Abstract
This paper deals with interactive multiple fund investment situations, in
which investors can invest their capital in a number of funds. The investors,
however, face some restrictions. In particular, the investment opportunities
of an investor depend on the behaviour of the other investors. Moreover,
the individual investment returns may diﬀer. We consider this situation from
a cooperative game theory point of view. Based on diﬀerent assumptions
modelling the gains of joint investment, we consider corresponding types of
games and analyse their properties. We propose an explicit allocation process
for the maximal total investment revenues.
1 Introduction
Of the many decisions that a ﬁrm has to make, none is likely to have more impact
than the decision to invest capital, which often involves large, extended commit-
ments of money and management time. Such investment decisions determine the
company’s future course and, hence, its market value. It is not surprising, therefore,
that ﬁrms devote much time and eﬀort to planning capital expenditure.
The importance of investment decisions is also reﬂected in the enormous amount
of attention that is devoted to it in the economic literature. In most of this litera-
ture on investment, ﬁrms are modelled as individually acting agents, ie, cooperation
between ﬁrms is not taken into account. Another assumption that is predominant
in the literature on investment, is that the agents face investment opportunities
that are exogenously given. That is, the investment opportunities of an agent are
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1not inﬂuenced by the investments of other agents; the strategic aspects of invest-
ment are often overlooked. In this paper, we analyse situations in which investment
opportunities of an agent depend on the behaviour of other investors. Moreover,
the situations will be analysed by taking into account the consequences of possible
cooperative behaviour.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of cooperative situations, called multiple
fund investment (MFI) situations. In an MFI situation, agents can invest their
capital in a certain number of funds. There are restrictions on the funds such
that there is a maximum number of capital units that can be invested in each of
them. The agents (players) in an MFI situation are characterised by the amount of
capital they can invest and by their individual returns on the diﬀerent funds. That
is, we consider the possibility that the return of an investment project depends
on the player (eg, ﬁrm) that is involved in this project. Furthermore, investment
opportunities are limited; we assume that the total capital available exceeds the
total investment opportunities.
Associated with each MFI situation, we deﬁne three cooperative MFI games in
characteristic function form. These games are based on three possible assumptions
on the coalitional expectations of the return on their joint investments. These
coalitional expectations relate to the behaviour of the players outside the coalition.
To actually calculate the coalitional values of the MFI games, one has to solve linear
programs. These turn out to be transportation problems, allowing for a fairly quick
calculation of these values.
The central question in an MFI situation is how to divide, in an acceptable
way, the maximal total investment revenues of the players if they all cooperate and
coordinate their investment plans in an optimal way. In this context, we study
properties of the associated cooperative games, in particular convexity and (total)
balancedness. We also propose a two-stage allocation rule for MFI situations. In
the ﬁrst stage, an allotment is made, which gives each player investment rights in
the various funds. In the second stage, the players are thought of as facing a linear
production situation (cf. Owen (1975)) in which their investment rights and capital
stock are resources. Owen vectors of this linear production situation are then seen
as solutions of the original MFI situation. Stability of these solutions is shown.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces MFI situations and the
three corresponding MFI games. In section 3, the properties of convexity and (total)
balancedness of these games are studied. In section 4, we introduce the concept of
2allotment and propose our two-stage solution for MFI situations. In section 5, we
elaborate on how our analysis can be extended when some of the assumptions are
modiﬁed.
2 The MFI model
A multiple fund investment or MFI situation is a tuple (N;M;e;A;d), where N =
f1;:::;ng is the set of players, M = f1;:::;mg denotes the set of available funds
and e 2 RM
++ is the vector of fund restrictions. An element ej denotes the maximum
number of capital units that can be invested in fund j. Furthermore, A 2 R
N£M
+
is the return matrix, where an element Aij denotes the revenue player i obtains
when he invests one unit of his capital in fund j. Finally, d 2 RN
++ is the vector of






Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. In order to deﬁne corresponding MFI
games, we ﬁrst state the program that determines the maximum revenue a coalition
S ½ N;S 6= ; can obtain when the fund restrictions are given by a vector z 2 RM
+ .











Xij · di for all i 2 S;
X
i2S
Xij · zj for all j 2 M;
Xij ¸ 0 for all i 2 S;j 2 M:
By introducing a dummy fund or player in order to obtain equality restrictions, this
problem is translated into a balanced transportation problem (cf. Hitchcock (1941)),
which can be solved very eﬃciently.
Facing fund restrictions z 2 RM
+ , the players in S will construct an optimal plan
XS 2 RS£M according to this program in order to maximise their total revenue.















1This assumption will be elaborated upon in section 4.
3For a plan X 2 RS£M, the corresponding revenues are given by the direct payoﬀ
vector O(X) 2 RS, where Oi(X) =
P
j2M AijXij for all i 2 N. The set of all






Once the members of a coalition S have decided upon a paricular plan XS, they
will invest their capital accordingly, thereby tightening the fund restrictions z. The
resulting fund restrictions z(XS) are given by
zj(X






for all j 2 M.
Using this notation, we now introduce three TU games that correspond to an MFI
situation. A TU (transferable utility) game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng is
the set of players and v : 2N ! R is the characteristic function, assigning to every
coalition S ½ N a value v(S), representing the total monetary payoﬀ the members
of S can guarantee themselves if they cooperate. By convention, v(;) = 0.
Depending on how the “guarantee” in the last paragraph is interpreted, an MFI
situation gives rise to three TU games, which will be denoted by v1, v2 and v3.
The common feature is that ﬁrst the players outside S can invest their capital and
afterwards the members of S invest optimally given the resulting (tightened) fund
restrictions. The diﬀerence between the games lies in the way the players outside S
are assumed to behave in the ﬁrst stage.





for all S ½ N;S 6= ;. That is, the players outside S, facing fund restrictions e, are
assumed to choose that feasible plan XNnS for which the resulting revenue for S,
facing fund restrictions e(XNnS), is minimal.
For our second game, we again take a pessimistic approach, but with the assump-
tion that the choice of the players in NnS is restricted to plans that maximise their





for all S ½ N;S 6= ;.
4For the third game, the players outside S also choose an optimal plan for them-
selves, giving them a revenue of DR(NnS;e). In the second stage, we assume that
the players in S can persuade the members of NnS to change their investment plan
as long as they still receive DR(NnS;e). Of course, coalition S will persuade them
to choose a plan in such a way that the two coalitions together generate a total
revenue of DR(N;e). After giving up the promised DR(NnS;e), the net revenue of
coalition S equals
v
3(S) = DR(N;e) ¡ DR(NnS;e):
Example 2.1 Consider the MFI situation (N;M;e;A;d) with three players (rows)












5 and d = (1;4;3).










with total payoﬀ 42 and direct payoﬀ O(XN) = (10;2;30).
Next, take S = f2;3g. In order to compute v1(S), we have to determine
where player 1 should invest his single unit of capital so that the resulting op-
timal payoﬀ to S is minimal. If player 1 invests his unit in fund 1 (X1 =












. Hence, v1(S) = 26.
For our second game, player 1 has to invest in fund 1, which is optimal for him.
As a result, v2(S) = 32.
For the third game, we ﬁrst determine DR(NnS;e), which equals 10 with plan
[ 1 0 ] for player 1. Hence, v3(S) = DR(N;e) ¡ DR(NnS;e) = 42 ¡ 10 = 32.
5In the following table, we list the direct revenues and the three coalitional values
of each coalition:
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
DR(S;e) 10 13 30 23 40 33 42
v1(S) 0 2 4 12 14 26 42
v2(S) 0 2 4 12 14 32 42
v3(S) 9 2 19 12 29 32 42
/
The ﬁrst game is the most pessimistic, whereas the third game is the most optimistic,
as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. Then for the three
corresponding games we have that v1(N) = v2(N) = v3(N) = DR(N;e) and
v1 · v2 · v3.
Proof:
The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows immediately from the deﬁnitions. The rela-
tion between v1 and v2 is obvious. It remains to show that v2 · v3. Let S ½ N;S 6= ;
and let XNnS 2 OP(NnS;e), resulting in the revenue of DR(NnS;e) for coalition
NnS. Let XS 2 OP(S;e(XNnS)), resulting in the revenue of DR(S;e(XNnS)) for
coalition S. If we combine the plans XNnS and XS, we obtain a feasible plan for
the grand coalition. Therefore,
v
2(S) + DR(NnS;e) · DR(S;e(X
NnS)) + DR(NnS;e) · DR(N;e):
Hence, v2(S) · v3(S). ¤
3 Properties of MFI games
In this section, we analyse some properties of our three MFI games. In particular,
we consider convexity and (total) balancedness.
A TU game (N;v) is called convex if
v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · v(T [ fig) ¡ v(T) (3.1)
for all i 2 N;S ½ T ½ Nnfig.
6In order to prove convexity of v3 we ﬁrst show that in terms of direct revenues,
larger coalitions beneﬁt more from a rise in the fund restrictions than do smaller










such that yi + zj ¸ Aij for all i 2 S;j 2 M;
yi ¸ ki for all i 2 S;
zj ¸ `j for all j 2 M;
where k 2 RS
+ and ` 2 RM
+ . If k = 0 and ` = 0, then (3.2) is the dual of (2.1).
First, we show how the solution of (3.2), (¯ y(k;`); ¯ z(k;`)) depends on `.
Lemma 3.1 Let `;`0 2 RM
+ be such that `0 ¸ `. Then
¯ z(k;`
0) ¸ ¯ z(k;`) (3.3)
for all k 2 RN
+.
Proof: If m = 1, then (3.3) is trivial. If n = 1, then we cannot have ¯ y(k;`0) >
¯ y(k;`), since this would contradict optimality of (¯ y(k;`); ¯ z(k;`)). From this, (3.3)
immediately follows. So, assume that m > 1;n > 1.
Clearly, it suﬃces to show that (3.3) holds for ` and `0 which diﬀer in only one
coordinate, so without loss of generality assume that `j = `0
j for all j 2 Mnf1g.
Then we can immediately conclude that ¯ z1(k;`0) ¸ ¯ z1(k;`). Substituting ¯ z1(k;`)
back into the program for DR(S;k;`) we obtain








such that yi + zj ¸ Aij for all i 2 S;j 2 Mnf1g;
yi ¸ ˆ ki for all i 2 S;
zj ¸ `j for all j 2 Mnf1g;
where ˆ ki = maxfki ¡ ¯ z1(k;`);0g for all i 2 S. So,
DR(S;k;`) = ej¯ z1(k;`) + DR(S;ˆ k;`Mnf1g);
where `Mnf1g = (`j)j2Mnf1g. Similarly,
7DR(S;k;`
0) = ej¯ z1(k;`
0) + DR(S;ˆ k
0;`Mnf1g)
with ˆ k0
i = maxfki¡¯ z1(k;`0);0g for all i 2 S. Note that ˆ k0
i · ˆ ki for all i 2 S. In order
to prove (3.3), we must show that ¯ z(ˆ k0;`Mnf1g) ¸ ¯ z(ˆ k;`Mnf1g). Again, it suﬃces to
show this for all ˆ k and ˆ k0 which diﬀer only in one coordinate, so, without loss of
generality assume that ˆ ki = ˆ k0
i for all Snf1g. Then we can immediately conclude
that ¯ y1(ˆ k0;`Mnf1g) · ¯ y1(ˆ k;`Mnf1g). Substituting ¯ y1(ˆ k;`Mnf1g) back into the program
for DR(S;ˆ k;`Mnf1g) we get








such that yi + zj ¸ Aij for all i 2 Snf1g;j 2 Mnf1g;
yi ¸ ˆ ki for all i 2 Snf1g;
zj ¸ ˆ `j for all j 2 Mnf1g;
where ˆ `j = maxf`j ¡ ¯ y1(ˆ k;`Mnf1g);0g for all j 2 Mnf1g. So,
DR(S;ˆ k;`Mnf1g) = d1¯ y1(ˆ k;`Mnf1g) + DR(Snf1g;ˆ kSnf1g; ˆ `Mnf1g):
Similarly,
DR(S;ˆ k
0;`Mnf1g) = d1¯ y1(ˆ k




j = maxf`j ¡ ¯ y1(ˆ k0;`Mnf1g);0g for all j 2 Mnf1g. Note that ˆ `0
j ¸ ˆ `j for all
j 2 Mnf1g. So, in order to prove (3.3), we have to show that ¯ z(ˆ kSnf1g; ˆ `0
Mnf1g) ¸
¯ z(ˆ kSnf1g; ˆ `Mnf1g). This is the same problem that we started with, but with one player
and one fund less. Repeating the same procedure until either m = 1 or n = 1, we
arrive at the result. ¤
With the previous lemma, we can now show that larger coalitions beneﬁt more from
an increase in the fund restrictions (in terms of direct revenues) than do smaller
coalitions.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. Then for all e0 2 RM such
that e0 ¸ e, we have
DR(T;e
0) ¡ DR(T;e) ¸ DR(S;e
0) ¡ DR(S;e)
for all S ½ T ½ N;S 6= ;.
8Proof: Clearly, it suﬃces to show the statement for all S ½ T ½ N;S 6= ; such
that jTnSj = 1. So, let t 2 N;S ½ Nnftg;S 6= ; and deﬁne T = S [ ftg.
The dual program for coalition S is given by (3.2) with k = 0 and ` = 0. The dual









such that yi + zj ¸ Aij for all i 2 S;j 2 M;
yt + zj ¸ Atj for all j 2 M;
yi ¸ 0 for all i 2 T;
zj ¸ 0 for all j 2 M:
Now we are going to increase the fund restrictions from e to e0 and show that the
increase in direct revenues for coalition T is larger than the increase for coalition
S. It suﬃces to show this for an increase in only one fund restriction, so assume
without loss of generality that e0
1 > e1 and e0
j = ej for all j 2 Mnf1g.
First note that when the ﬁrst fund restriction increases from e1 to e0
1, the feasible
regions of the two linear programs remain the same. The only thing that can happen
by altering the objective functions is that the optimal face in one (or both) of the
programs changes. When gradually increasing the ﬁrst fund restriction from e1 to
e0
1, the optimal faces of the two minimisation programs may change several times.
However, the number of such changes is ﬁnite. So, we divide the increase from e1
to e0
1 into a ﬁnite number of smaller increases for which the optimal face is constant
(except at the boundary, where the optimal face may be larger), and show for each
of these smaller increases that coalition T beneﬁts more than coalition S. Hence,
without loss of generality, we can assume that there exist solutions (¯ yS; ¯ zS) and
(¯ yT; ¯ zT) for the programs for S and T, respectively, which remain solutions if we go
from e1 to e0
1.
Since by assumption, the solutions of the two programs do not change and the ﬁrst
fund restriction only appears in the objective function, it suﬃces to show that its
coeﬃcient z1 is larger in the solution for T that in the solution for S, ie,
¯ z
T




t , the program for T can be rewritten as follows:










9such that yi + zj ¸ Aij for all i 2 S;j 2 M;
yi ¸ 0 for all i 2 S;
zj ¸ cj for all j 2 M;
where cj = maxfAtj ¡ ¯ yT
t ;0g for all j 2 M. So, DR(T;0;0) = dt¯ yT
t + DR(S;0;c).
Hence, the diﬀerence with the program for S only lies in the right hand sides of the
inequalities corresponding to the zj;j 2 M. If c = 0, then we immediately have
¯ zT
1 = ¯ zS
1. For other c 2 RM
+ , the result follows from Lemma 3.1. ¤
Theorem 3.3 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. Then the corresponding
game v3 is convex.
Proof: Let i 2 N;S ½ T ½ Nnfig. If S = ;, then (3.1) is trivial. Otherwise, it
suﬃces to show that
DR(S [ fig;e) ¡ DR(S;e) ¸ DR(T [ fig;e) ¡ DR(T;e): (3.4)
Let XT[fig 2 OP(T [ fig;e) and denote x = (X
T[fig
ij )j2M. Then we have
DR(T [ fig;e) ¡ DR(T;e) = DR(T;e ¡ x) + Oi(X
T[fig) ¡ DR(T;e):
Suppose that player i invests according to x and that the players in S invest ac-
cording to some plan XS 2 OP(S;e ¡ x). Combining these, we obtain a plan
XS[fig 2 FP(S [ fig;e). Therefore,
DR(S [ fig;e) ¡ DR(S;e) ¸ DR(S;e ¡ x) + Oi(X
T[fig) ¡ DR(S;e):
So, in order to prove (3.4), it suﬃces to show that
DR(S;e ¡ x) + Oi(X
T[fig) ¡ DR(S;e) ¸ DR(T;e ¡ x) + Oi(X
T[fig) ¡ DR(T;e);
or equivalently,
DR(T;e) ¡ DR(T;e ¡ x) ¸ DR(S;e) ¡ DR(S;e ¡ x):
This is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.2, so v3 is a convex game. ¤
From convexity of v3 and from Proposition 2.1 it follows that all three games are
balanced, ie, that their respective cores are nonempty, where the core of a game
(N;v) is deﬁned by








The games v1 and v2 need not be convex. However, the game v1 is totally balanced,
ie, for each S ½ N;S 6= ;, the subgame (S;v1
S) deﬁned by v1
S(T) = v1(T) for all
T ½ S is balanced.
Proposition 3.4 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. Then the corresponding
game v1 is totally balanced.
Proof: Let S ½ N;S 6= ;. In calculating v1(S), ﬁrst the players in NnS use their
investment capital to lower the fund restrictions in such a way that the revenues that
thereafter can be obtained by S are as low as possible. Let XNnS 2 FP(NnS;e)
denote an investment plan that is chosen by NnS for that reason. Consider the MFI
situation (S;M;e(XNnS);AS;dS) with AS = (Aij)i2S;j2M and dS = (di)i2S. Denote










for all T ½ S. To see this, notice that the fund restrictions faced by a coalition T in
calculating v1;S(T) are equal to the restrictions faced by T in calculating v1
S(T). Since
in the case of v1
S(T) this sum is distributed over the funds in the most pessimistic
way for coalition T, we have the stated inequality. Since v1;S is balanced, we have
that the subgame v1
S is balanced and hence, v1 is totally balanced. ¤
4 MFI solutions: a linear production approach
In this section, we present a procedure for solving MFI situations, ie, we propose
a method of dividing DR(N;e) among the players. This procedure consists of two
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a division of the investment rights in the available funds
(an allotment) is made. In the second stage, this allotment is used as an input
vector of a related linear production process and the eventual allocation for the
grand coalition is an Owen vector of this process.
11Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. An allotment is an investment plan




for all j 2 M.
An element Yij represents the amount that player i is allowed to invest in fund
j. When the players individually invest in the funds according to the investment
rights they receive from an allotment Y , a payoﬀ vector O(Y ) 2 RN
+ results.
Example 4.1 One way to construct an allotment is simply to divide the investment
















Note that the corresponding direct payoﬀ O(Y ) = 1
8(57;60;126) is not eﬃcient with
respect to DR(N;e) = 42. /
The payoﬀ Oi(Y ) to player i 2 N according to Y can be viewed as the direct revenue
of coalition fig with fund restrictions (Yij)j2M, ie,
Oi(Y ) = DR(fig;(Yij)j2M)
for all i 2 N.
The players may decide to merge their investment rights and thereafter maximise







The joint revenues that coalition S can obtain when working together is then given
by DR(S;Y S). So, after an allotment Y is made, a new situation arises, which can
be modelled as a TU game. This game, denoted by vY, is deﬁned by
vY(S) = DR(S;Y
S)
12for all S ½ N;S 6= ;.
This process of joining the investment rights according to an allotment turns out
to be a linear production process. A linear production situation (cf. Owen (1975)
and Van Gellekom et al. (2000)) is a tuple (N;R;P;Q;B;c), where N is a ﬁnite
set of players, R is a ﬁnite set of resources, P is a ﬁnite set of products, Q 2 RR£P
is a technology matrix where Qrp represents the number of units of resource r 2 R
necessary to produce one unit of product p 2 P, B 2 RR£N is a resource matrix
where Bri represents the amount player i 2 N possesses of resource r 2 R and
c 2 RP is a market price vector of the products.
The maximal proﬁt that can be made from a resource bundle b 2 RR equals the






where the coordinate xp denotes the amount of product p that is produced.
A linear production situation L = (N;R;P;Q;B;c) gives rise to a corresponding





for every S ½ N, where F(S) = fx 2 RP
+ jQx · (
P
i2S Bri)r2Rg.








with F ¤ = fy 2 RR
+ jy>Q ¸ c>g, since it is readily checked that the feasible regions
F(S) and F ¤ are both nonempty.
Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation and let Y be an allotment. Each player
i is allowed to invest Yij units of his capital di in fund j, resulting in revenues of
Aij per invested unit. This is equivalent with saying that each player i can produce
one unit of a product pij by using one unit of his “capital resource” (of which he
possesses di) and one unit of his “investment right in fund j resource” (of which he
possesses Yij), with a market price for one unit of pij equal to Aij. So the situation
that arises after making the allotment Y can be characterised as a linear production
process (N;R;P;Q;B;c) in the following way:
13² N: the set of agents coincides with the player set of the underlying MFI
situation.




mg and jNj “capital” resources frc
1;:::;rc
ng.
² P: each player makes jMj diﬀerent products corresponding to the resources,
so we deﬁne jNjjMj products (pij)i2N;j2M.
² Q: the technology matrix is constructed in the following way. Every unit of
product is made by using one unit of a “fund” resource as well as one unit
of a “capital” resource. The ﬁrst jMj columns of A represent the products
made by the ﬁrst player, the following jMj columns represent the products of
the second player, and so on. The ﬁrst jMj rows of Q represent the “fund”
resources, the other rows represent the “capital” resources. For n = 3;m = 2,
the technology matrix Q looks as follows:
p11 p12 p21 p22 p31 p32
r
f
1 1 0 1 0 1 0
r
f
2 0 1 0 1 0 1
rc
1 1 1 0 0 0 0
rc
2 0 0 1 1 0 0
rc
3 0 0 0 0 1 1
² B: the “capital” resource bundles are provided directly by the MFI situation,
whereas the fund resources are given by Y . For n = 3;m = 2, the resource




1 Y11 Y21 Y31
r
f
2 Y12 Y22 Y32
rc
1 d1 0 0
rc
2 0 d2 0
rc
3 0 0 d3
² c: a product that is made of fund resource r
f
j and capital resource rc
i has price
Aij. So, given the structure of Q, c looks as follows:
14c = [A11;:::;A1m;A21;:::;A2m;:::;An1;:::;Anm]:
The Owen set of a linear production situation L = (N;R;P;Q;B;c) is deﬁned by
Owen(L) = fy
>B 2 R







where the vector y, being an optimal solution of the dual program, reﬂects the
shadow prices of the resources. An element of the Owen set is called an Owen
vector. Every Owen vector is an element of the core of the corresponding linear
production game:
Owen(L) ½ C(vL):
In particular, this implies that every linear production game is balanced. Also,
since every subgame corresponds in a natural way to a linear production situation
which is a “subsituation” of the original one, every linear production game is totally
balanced.
So, when an allotment Y is made, the situation that arises can be viewed as a
linear production process. We will refer to this process as L(Y ). It is easily veriﬁed
that the corresponding linear production game vL(Y ) coincides with vY.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation and let Y 2 FP(N;e) be an
allotment. Then vL(Y ) = vY.
As a consequence, vY is totally balanced for every allotment Y .
Given an allotment Y , we propose Owen(L(Y )) as solution for the MFI situa-
tion, where every Owen vector is an eﬃcient division of DR(N;e) (= vL(Y )(N)).
Irrespective of the allotment that is chosen, the resulting allocation lies in the core
of the most pessimistic MFI game v1, as is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation and let Y 2 FP(N;e) be an
allotment. Then Owen(L(Y )) ½ C(v1).
Proof: Let S ½ N;S 6= ;. Then






for some XNnS such that the resulting direct revenue for coalition S is minimal. So,

































Moreover, we have that given the total of fund restrictions
P
j2M ej(XNnS), the
division of this sum over the funds is such that DR(S;e(XNnS)) is as low as possible.
Hence,
vL(Y )(S) ¸ v
1(S):
Now, since any Owen vector of L(Y ) is in the core of the corresponding linear
production game L(Y ) and, trivially, vL(Y )(N) = v1(N), the statement follows. ¤
Example 4.2 Consider the MFI situation (N;M;e;A;d) of Example 2.1. Solving
the (dual) linear production program for the grand coalition yields a solution set
with two extreme points: (1;7;9;0;3) and (1;4;9;0;6), where the ﬁrst two coor-
dinates correspond to the “fund” resources and the other three to the “capital”










































Note that Owen(L(Y )) ½ C(v1). However, the Owen solution (12;12;18) is not an
element of C(v2), since 12 + 18 = 30 < 32 = v2(f2;3g). /
Suppose that for an allotment Y the corresponding direct division of revenues is
already eﬃcient with respect to DR(N;e), ie,
X
i2N
Oi(Y ) = DR(N;e);
or equivalently,
Y 2 OP(N;e):
Then the corresponding direct division of the revenues O(Y ) coincides with the
allocation that is proposed by the Owen set of the corresponding linear production
game. So according to this process there is no need to redistribute the allocation of
revenues as given by O(Y ). This is the result of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation. Let Y 2 OP(N;e). Then
Owen(L(Y )) = fO(Y )g:
Proof: Consider the linear production process L(Y ) and let S ½ N;S 6= ;. For





because Y 2 OP(N;e). Let y 2 Owen(L(Y )). Since the Owen vector is in the core
of the linear production game, we have
X
i2S











for all S ½ N and hence,
Owen(L(Y )) = fO(Y )g:
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For an optimal allotment Y 2 OP(N;e), the resulting allocation O(Y ) belongs to
the core of the most optimistic game v3, as is shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4 Let (N;M;e;A;d) be an MFI situation and let Y 2 OP(N;e). Then
O(Y ) 2 C(v3).
Proof: Let S ½ N;S 6= ;. Then
v









Together with eﬃciency, we obtain O(Y ) 2 C(v3). ¤
Because of Proposition 2.1, O(Y ) also belongs to C(v1) and C(v2).
To compare the various solutions, consider again the MFI situation of Exam-
ple 2.1. As we saw in Example 4.1, the direct payoﬀ corresponding to the propor-
tional allotment is not eﬃcient and hence, not an element of any of the three cores.
After constructing the corresponding linear production game and applying the Owen
procedure we obtained a solution set which is part of the core of v1, although not not
of v2 (and hence, v3). According to Theorem 4.4, the direct division corresponding
to the optimal plan XN in Example 2.1 should be in all three cores, which is indeed
the case.
5 Extensions
One of the assumptions in our MFI model is that the total capital available is




i2N di. Note that this
assumption is common in the bankruptcy literature (cf. O’Neill (1982)), where the
total amount of the “claims” (capital) exceeds the available “estate” (investment
opportunities). If we do not impose this assumption, we can still compute the three
corresponding games in the same way and the results of section 2 still hold.
The problem with dropping this assumption, however, lies in the concept of al-
lotment. An allotment is a feasible plan which is eﬃcient with respect to the fund
18restrictions. If the sum of the fund restrictions is larger than the total capital, such
a feasible plan does not exist. If we drop the requirement of feasibility of an al-
lotment and allow a player to have more investment rights than his total capital,
Theorem 4.2 no longer holds. However, an allotment Y for which the direct division
of revenues O(Y ) is eﬃcient with DR(N;e) is always in the core of all three games,
regardless whether we require an allotment to be feasible or not.
Another (implicit) assumption in our MFI model is that when a coalition S of
players decides to cooperate, they can coordinate their investment actions, but they
cannot pool their capital. If we allow capital to be transferable, the direct revenues
of S would be given by


















Xij · zj for all j 2 M;
Xij ¸ 0 for all i 2 S;j 2 M:
This maximisation problem, however, is quite trivial to solve. For each fund j 2 M,
the players in S determine ˜ ASj = maxi2S Aij and invest their capital in those funds
with the highest ˜ ASj, taking the fund restrictions into account.
For the transferable capital case, we can deﬁne the same three corresponding
games as for the nontransferable capital case. Again, we have that v1 · v2 · v3
and that v1 is totally balanced. However, the game v3 need not be convex (or even
balanced).
Allotments can be deﬁned in the same way as for nontransferable MFI situa-
tions, but the constructions of the corresponding linear production game is diﬀerent
and involves the introduction of an additional resource representing “total capital”.
With this adjusted linear production situation, the analysis of Section 3 can be fully
translated to the transferable capital setting.
A more detailed discussion of these and other extensions can be found in Wintein
(2002).
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